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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
PROVO CITY, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
BRENT ROLAND WARDEN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Utah Supreme Court 
Case No. 930059 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Case No. 910634-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Utah to hear this appeal 
is pursuant to Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
the Supreme Court of Utah having granted Appellant's Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Should Utah adopt a rule of law which holds that the United 
States Constitution allows an individual to be seized by any police 
officer who reasonably believes there is an imminent danger to the 
individual's life or limb, without judicial assessment of the 
reliability of the information upon which the officer acts? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES, ETC. 
United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
Utah Code Annotated, §77-7-15 
Authority of peace officer to stop and question suspect - Grounds. 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place 
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting 
to commit a public offense and may demand his name, 
address and an explanation of his actions. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 801(c) 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one 
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or 
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 802. Hearsay rule. 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by 
these rules. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(All references are to the transcript of trial and 
suppression hearing as 
such transcript has been paginated by the 
certified shorthand reporter) 
WARDEN was charged with violating Provo City Ordinance, §9/41-
6-44, Provo City's equivalent of the State's statute prohibiting 
driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs. He filed a 
motion to suppress all evidence gathered as a result of the stop of 
his automobile, claiming that his seizure was unlawful because the 
officer who stopped his automobile did not have a reasonable 
suspicion that he had committed a traffic offense or was otherwise 
involved in criminal activity. 
On September 18, 1991, a combined trial and suppression 
hearing was heard by the Honorable Joseph I. Dimick, Judge of the 
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Fourth Circuit Court, State of Utah, Provo City Department. The 
only evidence introduced at the hearing was the testimony of Provo 
City Officer Devon Jensen who seized WARDEN. (P. 4-12). Over 
WARDEN'S objection, the trial court allowed the officer to testify 
that two (2) unidentified young men had told him that WARDEN had 
asked them where he could buy some "coke" so he could drive into a 
wall. (P. 5, 6). The trial court ruled that the out-of-court 
statements of the two (2) unidentified young men could be admitted 
because the City was not offering them for the truth of what was 
asserted. (P. 5, 6). The two (2) unidentified young men did not 
appear at the suppression hearing, presumably because the City did 
not know their identity. The officer testified that he had no 
reason other than the statement of these two (2) unidentified young 
men to stop WARDEN. (P. 11). 
After extensive argument in the form of colloquy between the 
court and WARDEN'S counsel, the trial court ruled that WARDEN was 
properly seized on the theory of a "welfare stop" and that the 
relative truth of the statements from the two (2) unidentified 
young men was irrelevant. (P. 13-28) . Accordingly, the trial 
court denied WARDEN'S Motion to Suppress. 
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of 
WARDEN'S Motion to Suppress. m so doing, the Court of Appeals 
adopted a new rule of law legitimizing "community caretaker 
automobile stops." (Opinion, Case No. 910634-CA, page 7). The 
Court of Appeals also determined that the truth of the out-of-court 
statements of the two (2) unidentified young men was irrelevant and 
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that inquiry into the reliability or corroboration of the statement 
was therefore unnecessary. (Opinion id., page 9). The Opinion of 
the Utah Court of Appeals was filed on December 9, 1992, and has 
been published as Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360. A copy of 
the Court of Appeals slip opinion is included in the addendum to 
this brief. WARDEN filed a Petition for Rehearing which was denied 
by written Order of the Utah Court of Appeals filed on January 4, 
1993. Warden thereafter petitioned for this court's Writ of 
Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals. The petition was granted 
on 30 March, 1993. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(All references are to the transcript of trial and 
suppression hearing as 
such transcript has been paginated by the 
certified shorthand reporter) 
Officer Jensen of the Provo City Police Department was on 
patrol at about 2:00 in the morning of May 9, 1991, (page 4). 
While driving through the Denny's Restaurant parking lot on the 
north end of Provo, he was approached by two (2) citizens who 
walked up to the open window of his automobile door and told the 
officer that a male had come up to them and asked them where he 
could buy some "coke" so he could drive into a wall (page 5) . They 
also described the vehicle the male was driving as a white Pontiac 
and gave the officer the plate number (page 6). 
The two (2) informants then jumped in their car and drove off. 
The officer broadcast the description of the automobile with an 
attempt to locate (page 7) and proceeded to University Avenue, 
which was south of his location, because the individuals had 
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advised him that they told the male to try downtown (page 7) . The 
officer spotted the described vehicle at approximately 12th North 
and University Avenue going north (away from the downtown area) as 
he was proceeding south (pages 7 and 8) . Officer Jensen made a U-
turn and came in right behind the vehicle as it was making a left 
turn onto 12 3 0 North from University Avenue (page 8) • Officer 
Jensen described the driving pattern of the vehicle as "normal" and 
indicated that the vehicle had its left turn signal on (page 8)• 
He also noted that the vehicle turned into the outside lane, 
although he noted that that is a "common thing that most people do 
anyway" (page 8). After following the vehicle for approximately a 
block and one-half and noting that it appeared to be going at a 
normal rate of speed, the officer made a traffic stop of the 
vehicle (page 8). 
Officer Jensen testified that he initiated the stop for the 
reason that the people back at Denny's had told him that the driver 
had an open container between his legs and for the reason that "I 
had some concern for the person's mental stability and welfare on 
his own behalf, that he was—he had made a threat to his own life" 
(pages 8 and 9) . On questioning from the court, the officer 
indicated that he was making a "welfare" stop, not a DUI stop (page 
11). He indicated that the stop was not based on anything he had 
seen but based only upon what the two (2) young men had told him. 
Specifically, he was concerned for the person's welfare and mental 
stability and that he might have an open container between his legs 
(page 11). The officer did not testify that he had been advised 
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that the open container could be observed to contain any liquid or 
that the two (2) young men were able to observe whether the 
container had markings of an alcoholic beverage or otherwise, [The 
trial court found that the stop was not based on reasonable 
suspicion of an open container violation (pages 18 and 19)]• On 
cross-examination, the officer testified that he did not personally 
know these two (2) individuals from prior occasions, that they had 
not given reliable information in the past on police matters, or 
that he had any idea who they were (page 12). 
After stopping the vehicle, the officer approached and asked 
the driver for his license and registration (page 9). The officer 
noted an odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from WARDEN'S breath 
and that his balance was unsteady (page 29). The officer did not 
testify that he observed an open container in the vehicle. WARDEN 
then performed a walk-and-turn and a one-leg-stand test. The 
officer noted that WARDEN had a difficult time following the 
officer's instructions and completing the sobriety test 
satisfactorily (page 29) . WARDEN was arrested on the probable 
cause that he was driving under the influence of alcohol and 
transported to take an intoxilyzer test which recorded a blood 
alcohol content of .080 (pages 29 and 30). 
SUMMARY OF ^ THE ARGUMENT 
A warrantless seizure of an individual is not reasonable for 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
where the seizure is based solely on a police officer's good faith 
belief that information provided to him by a third party would 
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justify the seizure. The seized person is entitled to judicial 
assessment of the reliability of the facts and circumstances of the 
information giving rise to the seizure. The Utah Court of Appeals 
erred in its holding that the truth of the information provided to 
the officer was irrelevant to a determination of the lawfulness of 
the seizure. 
ARGUMENT 
PREFACE TO ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the concept of a 
"community caretaking automobile stop" is an issue of first 
impression in Utah. (Opinion, pages 3 and 4) . The Court therefore 
turned to holdings from several other jurisdictions for guidance in 
developing the new concept. Eight (8) of the cases referred to by 
the Court of Appeals involved fact settings where the seizing 
officer personally observed the circumstances leading to a 
community caretaking automobile stop. United States v. Dunbar, 470 
Fed. Sup. 704 Dist. of Conn., afffd, 610 F.2d 807 (2d Cir., 1979); 
State v. Goetaski. 507 A.2d 751 (New Jersey Sup. Ct. 1986), cert, 
denied 517 A.2d 443 (New Jersey 1986); McDouqal v. State, 580 S.2d 
324 (Florida Ct. App. 1991); State v. Parker, 503 A.2d 809 (New 
Hampshire 1985); State v. Chisolm, 696 P. 2d 41 (Wash. App. Ct. 
1985); Russell v. Municipality erf Anchorage, 706 P.2d 687 (Alaska 
Ct. App. 1985); Crauthers v. State, 727 P.2d 9 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1986); and Ozhuwan v. State, 786 P.2d 918 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990). 
The ninth case, State v. Anderson, 417 NW.2d 411 (Wise. Ct. 
App. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 454 NW.2d 763 (Wisq. 1990), was 
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relied upon heavily by the Court of Appeals in formulating its 
three-tiered test. In Anderson it is not clear whether the seizing 
officers personally observed the activity giving rise to the stop 
of Anderson's automobile. But the Utah Court of Appeals1 Opinion 
cites to the Anderson court's determination that such a stop 
"requires an objective analysis of the circumstances confronting 
the police officer, including the nature and reliability of his for 
herl information, with a view toward determining whether the police 
conduct was reasonable and justified." (Emphasis added) (Opinion, 
page 6). 
In this case, the officer did not personally observe any 
activity on the part of WARDEN that would have justified a stop for 
penal, investigatory, or welfare reasons. The stop was based 
totally on information provided to the officer by two (2) unknown 
young men who did not appear or give testimony at the suppression 
hearing. The information was not verified or corroborated. The 
historical veracity of the two (2) young men was unknown because 
their identity was unknown. They were not subjected to cross-
examination. The truthfulness and accuracy of their statement was 
not assessed by the trial court. Their credibility was deemed 
irrelevant by the trial court and the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Nevertheless, in contrast ta the fact settings of the majority 
of the cases referred to and in contrast to the referenced language 
of Anderson, the Court of Appeals held that the out-of-court 
statements here were properly admitted to "[evaluate] the manner in 
which a reasonable officer would respond given this information);,]" 
8 
and that the trial court was correct in "admitt[ing] these 
statements as evidence of verbal acts, and not for their 
substantive truth11 (Opinion, page 9) . In so doing, just as the 
trial court had, the Utah Court of Appeals reasoned that the truth 
of the statement made to the officer was irrelevant and that the 
seizure could be upheld on the strength of "the officer's belief 
that the circumstances were exigent, requiring him to take action 
for Warden's safety" (Opinion, page 9). 
WARDEN agrees with the Utah Court of Appeal's assessment that 
the stopping of an automobile and the detention of its occupants is 
a seizure which must be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 
(1979). WARDEN also concedes that "[i]t would be too extravagant to 
contend that a benign purpose of rendering assistance could never 
justify the stop of a motorist." United States v Dunbar, 470 Fed. 
Sup. 7 04 (Dist. of Conn.). But this Court has never before held 
that a seizure can be lawfully effected based solely on an 
officer's good faith belief that the seizure is justified, and the 
reliability of information forming the basis for a seizure has 
never before been held irrelevant by this Court. For the reasons 
that follow this Court should not so rule now. 
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
There is not a universally accepted standard of review in Utah 
for the determination of the legality of a seizure. In State v 
Mendoza/Mendieta, 748 P.2d 181 (1987) this Court held as follows: 
In determining whether the facts support a reasonable 
suspicion that a vehicle is engaged in illegal activity, 
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the trial court must consider the totality of the 
circumstances facing the officers. (Citation). The 
reviewing court should not overturn the trial court's 
determination unless it is clearly erroneous. Id. 
In footnote #3 of State v Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (1991), this 
Court explained its earlier statements on the issue of the proper 
standard of review of admission of evidence: 
We acknowledge that some of our cases have stated that 
the standard of review for certain threshold 
constitutional questions is whether the trial court 
committed clear error or abused its discretion. 
(Citations). However, a closer inspection of those cases 
reveals that the 'abuse of discretion1 terminology is 
used inappropriately. Whether a piece of evidence is 
admissible is a question of law, and we always review 
questions of law under a correctness standard. 
(Citations). 
.... 
In reviewing the trial court's decision to admit, which 
includes the determination of which version of facts to 
believe, we review for correctness. But a correctness 
review necessarily incorporates a review of the trial 
court's resolution of the factual questions and the 
associated determination of credibility that may underlie 
the decision to admit. This subsidiary determination 
will be overturned only if clearly erroneous. 
Again, it is possible that we might refer casually to 
this standard of review as an 'abuse of discretion1 
standard. In fact, it is not. It is a correctness 
standard, which incorporates a clearly erroneous standard 
for the review of subsidiary factual determinations. 
In State v Gardiner, 814 P. 2d 568 (1991) , this court seemed to 
apply this bifurcated standard of review generally to all legal 
issues having subsidiary factual determinations: 
[I]n cases involving mixed questions of fact and law 
where the judge makes a determination on contested facts, 
we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
trial court's ruling and reverse only if the necessary 
factual findings implicit in the court's ruling lack 
sufficient evidentiary support. (Citations) In 
reviewing the application of the law to those facts and 
findings, we apply a correctness standard and reverse if 
the legal standard is not satisfied. 
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In State v. Brown, 201 Ut. Adv. Rep. 4 (1992), this court, 
citing to Ramirez, specifically applied the bifurcated standard of 
review to reviews of rulings on motions to suppress (this standard 
was applied by this panel of the Utah Court of Appeals in this 
case, see Opinion, page 3): 
We review the factual findings underlying the trial 
court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress 
evidence using a clearly erroneous standard. We review 
the trial court•s conclusions of law based on these facts 
under a correctness standard. 
This bifurcated standard of review of a motion to suppress 
evidence involving the seizure of a motorist in southern Utah was 
also applied by the 10th Federal Circuit Court in United States v. 
Walker, 933 F.2d 812 (10th Cir. 1991): 
At a hearing on a motion to suppress, the credibility of 
the witnesses and the weight to be given the evidence, 
together with the inferences, deductions and conclusions 
to be drawn from the evidence, are all matters to be 
determined by the trial judge. (Citations) Accordingly, 
we review the evidence in a light favorable to the 
district court's determination. Id. The ultimate 
determination of reasonableness under the Fourth 
Amendment, however, is a determination of law that we 
review de novo. (Citation) 
In State v. Thurman. 203 Ut. Adv. Rep. 18 (1993), this Court 
extensively discussed the policy considerations involved in 
determining the proper standard of review and again applied the 
bifurcated standard of review to two issues having mixed questions 
of fact and law - voluntariness of consent and attenuation. 
Notwithstanding Ramirez, Gardiner, Brown, Walker, and Thurman, 
there is still much disagreement and confusion among practitioners 
and courts concerning the proper standard of review to be applied 
to the determination of the legality of a seizure. (See 
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"Investigatory Stops Revisited", Sharon Kishner and Judge Lynn W. 
Davis, Utah Bar Journal, Vol 6 No. 5, page 10, May, 1993). This is 
probably attributable to the fact that, while the cases have 
applied the bifurcated standard to reviews of rulings on motions to 
suppress and to issues involving mixed questions of fcict and law 
generally (Gardiner, Brown, and Walker), this Court has not yet 
specifically applied the bifurcated standard to the* determination 
of the legality of a seizure and as yet has not distinguished, 
explained, or overruled Mendoza. 
This confusion is exemplified by the recent case of State v. 
Rochelle, 210 Ut. Adv. Rep. 40 (Ut. App. 1993) which was decided 
after all of the foregoing Utah Supreme Court cases. The three-
judge panel in Rochelle unanimously affirmed the trial court's 
denial of Rochelle's motion to suppress, finding the detention and 
pat-down of Rochelle reasonable. However, while the author of the 
lead opinion applied a bifurcated standard of review, two (2) 
judges of the panel concurred separately to emphasize that the 
trial court's ultimate finding on reasonable suspicion to detain 
and reasonableness of a pat-down search was properly reviewed 
against a clearly erroneous standard: 
The lead opinion erroneously implies we are reviewing the 
trial court's finding of reasonable suspicion for 
correctness. The Utah Supreme Court has unequivocally 
stated that a trial court's ultimate finding of 
reasonable suspicion is to be given deference by a 
reviewing court. State v Mendoza, 748 P. 2d 181,183 (Utah 
1987) . 
A reviewing court may therefore disturb a trial court's 
finding of reasonable suspicion only if it is clearly 
erroneous. 
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WARDEN urges that this Court has clearly stated its 
determination that the bifurcated standard of review is proper for 
issues involving mixed questions of fact and law; that a stop of an 
automobile and seizure of its occupants (whether on suspicion of 
criminality or for community caretaking reasons) necessarily 
involves mixed questions of fact and law; and that the proper 
standard of review of the legality of such a seizure is therefore 
to show deference to the trial court's subsidiary factual findings 
but to review the ultimate determination of the reasonableness of 
the seizure for correctness. A clear statement explaining or 
distinguishing Mendoza in light of the foregoing recent holdings of 
this Court would certainly be helpful to the bench and bar who 
practice in this field. 
POINT I 
THE SECOND TIER OF THE "COMMUNITY CARETAKER AUTOMOBILE 
STOP" TEST DEVELOPED BY THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MISAPPLIES THE "HYPOTHETICAL REASONABLE OFFICER" STANDARD OF 
THE PRETEXT STOP DOCTRINE 
The Utah Court of Appeals explained that the purpose of the 
second tier of the "community caretaking automobile" test is to 
determine whether "under the given circumstances, would a 
reasonable officer have stopped a vehicle for a purpose consistent 
with community caretaker functions?" (Opinion, page 7). The 
Opinion cites to State v. Lopez, 831 P. 2d 1040 at 1046 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 1992) for an explanation of the "reasonable officer" standard. 
The Court of Appeals has misapplied the "reasonable officer" 
standard of Lopez to the "community caretaker automobile stop." In 
Lopez the "hypothetical reasonable officer" standard in the context 
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of the pretext stop doctrine was discussed in detail. The Lopez 
court explained: 
In Utah, the pretext doctrine applies in cases where an 
officer claims to have stopped a vehicle for a minor 
traffic violation, but where the court determines the 
stop was not made because of the traffic violation but 
rather due to an unconstitutional motivation and, 
therefore, the officer has deviated from the normal 
course of action expected of a reasonable officer. 
(Citation omitted). We have articulated the pretext 
doctrine as whether a "reasonable...officer, in view of 
the totality of the circumstances confronting him or her, 
would have stopped" the vehicle for the traffic violation 
absent the unconstitutional motivation. 
The proper inquiry does not focus on whether the officer 
could validly have made the stop. State v. Sierra, 754 
P.2d at 978 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988). 
The "hypothetical reasonable officer" test in the context of 
the pretext stop doctrine necessarily begins with a threshold 
finding that a bona fide traffic violation occurred. Only after 
the predicate of a minor offense has been established is there an 
assessment of whether the minor offense was used as a pretext by 
the officer to unreasonably search for more serious criminal 
activity. See State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879 (failure to use turn 
signal); State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767 (following too closely); 
and State v. Marshall, 791 P. 2d 880 (failure to turn off turn 
signal). The pretext doctrine assesses whether a "hypothetically 
reasonable officer" would have stopped the vehicle for the minor 
violation, but for an unconstitutional motivation. Step one—did 
an offense occur? Step two—would a reasonable officer have 
bothered to stop the driver for that offense? 
However, the second tier of the "community caretaker 
automobile stop" test purports to apply the "hypothetical 
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reasonable officer" standard to the determination of whether a 
reason exists for the stop in the first place. In this regard, the 
second tier of the test distorts the reasoning and purpose behind 
the "hypothetical reasonable officer" standard. While the Court of 
Appeals stated that the second tier is a test of the reasonableness 
of the actions of the officer "based on an objective analysis" 
(Opinion, page 7) , when applied to the facts of this case it can be 
seen that the meaning of the "hypothetical reasonable officer" 
standard and the roles of the trial court and the officer become 
blurred in the context of the "community caretaking automobile 
stop" test. 
Properly applied, the "hypothetical reasonable officer" test 
is meant to prevent an overzealous officer from bootstrapping a 
relatively minor offense that would be disregarded by a 
"hypothetical reasonable officer" into an unjustified investigation 
of a hunch. As applied in the context of the "community caretaking 
automobile stop" - as this case demonstrates - the principal can be 
improperly used to provide a basis for a seizure where sufficient 
evidence to support the seizure is not otherwise available to the 
court. It is inconsistent for the Court of Appeals to hold in this 
case that on the one hand the reasons for the stop must be "based 
upon an objective analysis" while on the other hand that the truth 
of the statement from the two (2) unidentified young men (which 
formed the sole basis for the seizure) is irrelevant. This new 
test does not simply gauge whether a reasonable officer would have 
made the stop but whether the officer reasonably believed he could 
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make the stop. In other words, the second tier of the test only 
"objectively analyzes" whether the officer acted in good faith in 
believing that he had a reason to stop the car. 
WARDEN argues that the Court of Appeals erred in fashioning 
the second tier of the test insofar as the test only demands that 
the officer reasonably believe there is justification for the 
seizure. It is the court, rather than the officer, that should be 
making findings of fact and a determination of reasonableness of 
the stop by independently assessing the reliability and strength of 
the evidence properly before it. WARDEN is somewhat surprised that 
in this case both the trial court and the Court of Appeals allowed 
the officer to usurp the court's role. Under this test, the role 
of the trial court is reduced from its proper function of trying 
the facts to simply assessing the reasonableness of the officer's 
reaction to hypothetical (but not proved) facts. The role of the 
defendant at the suppression hearing is essentially eliminated 
because the relative truth of the facts substantiating the seizure 
is deemed irrelevant and therefore challenging the reliability of 
the information is unnecessary. This, of course, is not how the 
system or court is intended to function. As another panel of the 
Court of Appeals reasoned in State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Ut App 
1988), a "reviewing court [musty assess the reasonableness of the 
police action against an objective standard, not the subjective 
good faith of the individual officer." 
WARDEN strongly urges this Court to make it clear that the 
trial court - and not the officer - makes findings on the 
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sufficiency of the evidence in determining the reasonableness of a 
seizure. It should be made clear that the trial court does not 
defer to the officer's determination of the credibility and 
reliability of witnesses. This Court can do so by holding that the 
second tier of the "community caretaking automobile stop" must 
objectively analyze the evidence supporting the seizure rather than 
the officer's good faith beliefs. 
In this case, because the statement from the two (2) 
unidentified young men was not admitted for its truth, the evidence 
before the trial court could not support the stop of WARDEN'S 
automobile. The lower courts' reliance on the good faith beliefs 
of the seizing officer was misplaced as was the Court of Appeals1 
reference to the "hypothetical reasonable officer" standard. This 
Court should take this opportunity to dispel any implication in the 
holding of the Utah Court of Appeals that an individual can be 
seized on the basis of an officer's good faith that there is 
justification for the seizure, whether for criminal or caretaking 
purposes. 
POINT II 
THE SECOND TIER OF THE "COMMUNITY CARETAKER AUTOMOBILE 
STOP" TEST CONFLICTS WITH DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT 
OF UTAH WHICH HAVE FOUND A "GOOD FAITH" EXCEPTION 
INAPPROPRIATE IN THE CONTEXT OF WARRANTLESS SEIZURES AND ARRESTS 
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was not error for the trial 
court to admit the out-of-court statements of the two (2) 
unidentified young men through the testimony of the officer at the 
17 
suppression hearing, reasoning that the information from the two 
(2) unidentified young men was not admitted for the truth asserted, 
rather "the statements were used to explain the officer's belief 
that the circumstances were exigent, requiring him to take action 
for Warden's safety." (Opinion, page 9). Obviously, such a ruling 
means that the second tier of the "community caretaking automobile 
stop" test does not require the trial court to make an independent 
determination of the reliability or credibility of the evidence 
supporting the stop. Rather, the test only looks to whether the 
officer was objectively reasonable in his belief that the evidence 
would justify the stop. The second tier is a test of the good 
faith of the officer. 
In State v. Lopez, 451 P.2d 772 (Ut. 1969), the Utah Supreme 
Court ruled that the requirement of reasonable cause for a felony 
arrest "is not satisfied merely by a showing that an officer acted 
in good faith,..." In State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Ut. 1987), 
the Utah Supreme Court considered the "good faith" exception of 
former §77-35-12 (g) (1) , Utah Code Annotated. The Mendoza court 
determined that the statute was unconstitutional because, among 
other reasons, the exception "by its own terms, could never apply 
to an investigatory stop and search." (Mendoza at 185). The 
Mendoza court reasoned that whether or not the "good faith" 
exception of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) applied to 
search warrants, the exception could never apply where there is "no 
outside authority on which the officers could reasonably rely...." 
(Mendoza at 185) . "If no reasonable suspicion exists to justify an 
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investigatory stop, rendering a subsequent search illegal, then the 
officer whose conduct is in question could not have acted 
reasonably." (Mendoza at 186). Justice Durham wrote the Mendoza 
Decision. Justice Stewart concurred without comment. Justices 
Zimmerman and Howe concurred that the "good faith" exception cannot 
be applied to warrantless searches. Only Justice Hall reserved 
judgment as to whether the exclusionary rule and its Leon "good 
faith" exception applies to warrantless searches. 
Similarly, in State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Ut. 1991), the 
Utah Supreme Court ruled on the application of a "good faith" 
exception in the context of the Attorney General's investigatory 
subpoenas. Although Thompson involves an interpretation of the 
Utah Constitution, the holding analygizes to the reasoning inherent 
in Leon and its application to the Constitution of the United 
States. The Thompson court noted that "the touch-tone of the 
[Supreme] court's decision was the police officer's objectively 
reasonable reliance on the determination of a magistrate or a 
legislature that the challenged search in fact met the standards 
required by the Fourth Amendment." (Thompson at 419). Although no 
decision was reached on this exact issue, the Thompson court was 
persuasive in its reasoning that the "good faith" exception cannot 
apply where there has been no intervening action by a magistrate or 
a legislature upon which the officer can reasonably rely. Justice 
Howe authored the Opinion in Thompson. Chief Justice Hall 
concurred, Justice Zimmerman and Justice Durham concurred. Justice 
Stewart dissented without issuing an opinion. 
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It is conceded that Lopez, Mendoza, and Thompson do not 
involve welfare stops. Nevertheless, these cases expose the 
problems inherent in applying the "good faith" exception to any 
warrantless seizure not based on prior magisterial or legislative 
authority. It appears that this Court has not sanctioned a "good 
faith" exception to warrantless seizures when given the opportunity 
to do so. As this Court reasoned in Mendoza, if the officer cannot 
articulate specific facts upon which the stop can be deemed 
reasonable in the first place thereby making a subsequent search 
invalid, the officer cannot have relied in good faith on his own 
unreasonableness so as to insulate the search from his own 
unreasonableness. In this context, the distinction between penal 
and benign stops is a distinction without a difference. 
Further, warrantless seizures are per se invalid, Katz v» 
United States, 3 89 US 347 (1967) . The State has the burden of 
establishing an exception to the constitutional requirement for a 
warrant, Lopez, supra. If the officer is allowed to assert his 
good faith belief in the statement of the two (2) unidentified 
young men and if the State is not required to establish to the 
court's satisfaction, the truth of the young men's statement, then 
the State has not established a constitutionally recognized 
exception to the warrant requrrement and the burden has been 
impermissibly shifted to the Defendant to disprove the officer's 
good faith. 
Even if such a shifting of burdens was permissible, how could 
the Defendant ever disprove the officer's good faith?. 
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The second tier of the "community caretaking automobile stop" 
test emphasizes the objective reasonableness of the seizing officer 
rather than the reliability of the evidence upon which the officer 
relies (in this case the Court of Appeals acknowledged that the 
statement from the two (2) unidentified young men was not admitted 
for its substantive truth). As such, this second tier allows for 
stops based only upon the officer's objective good faith. This 
Court has previously held that a warrantless seizure cannot be 
based only on the officer's good faith. This Court should hold the 
"community caretaking automobile stop" concept developed by the 
Court of Appeals invalid insofar as it focuses only on the 
officer's good faith as opposed to the reliability of the evidence 
purportedly justifying the stop. 
POINT III 
THE SECOND TIER OF THE "COMMUNITY CARETAKER AUTOMOBILE 
STOP" TEST IS IN CONFLICT WITH CASE LAW ESTABLISHED IN 
HOLDINGS FROM SEVERAL JURISDICTIONS ENTERED IN 
ANALOGOUS CASES 
Because the question presented in this case is one of first 
impression in Utah, it was appropriate for the Court of Appeals to 
turn to case law developed in analogous cases for guidance in the 
formulation of a test to determine if WARDEN was properly seized. 
While the Court of Appeals looked at other "welfare stop" cases 
from other jurisdictions as noted above, it did not acknowledge or 
utilize the case law that has developed in other relevant and 
analogous cases involving seizures based on information provided 
from third parties. Four (4) lines of cases have developed, each 
assessing a different type of third party information: (a) the 
21 
"fellow officer11 rule, (b) informant tips in Terry stops, (c) 
informant tips in requests for search warrants, and (d) "citizen" 
tips in requests for search warrants. None of these lines of cases 
allows an officer to effect a seizure based solely on his good 
faith reliance on the information provided to him; each line 
requires an assessment of the reliability and/or corroboration of 
the facts provided to the officer. 
(a) "Fellow officer" rule: 
In Whitelev v. Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 
560 (1971), the United States Supreme Court held that an arrest 
conducted by a Laramie, Wyoming, patrolman was invalid despite the 
patrolman's reliance on a bulletin requesting aid in the service of 
an arrest warrant issued by the Sheriff of Carbon County, Wyoming. 
It was determined that the information available to the Carbon 
County Sheriff was itself inadequate to justify the arrest warrant. 
In holding that the Laramie patrolman's arrest was likewise 
invalid, the Supreme Court noted: 
Certainly police officers called upon to aid other 
officers in executing arrest warrants are entitled to 
assume that the officers requesting aid offered the 
magistrate information requisite to support independent 
judicial assessment of probable cause. Where, however, 
the contrary turns out to be true, an otherwise illegal 
arrest cannot be insulated from challenge by the decision 
of the instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to 
make the arrest. 
Later, in United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985), the 
United States Supreme Court applied the "fellow officer" principal 
enunciated in Whiteley to investigative (Terry) stops. Hensley was 
stopped by officers from one Ohio city for investigation of an 
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armed robbery. The seizing officers relied on a bulletin or 
"flyer" that had been issued by officers from another Ohio city. 
The Supreme Court upheld Hensley1s seizure. But in so doing the 
court, referring to the Whiteley principal held: 
We conclude that, if a flyer or bulletin has been issued 
on the basis of articulable facts supporting a reasonable 
suspicion that the wanted person has committed an 
offense, then reliance on that flyer or bulletin 
justifies a stop to check identification. 
If the flyer has been issued in the absence of a 
reasonable suspicion, then a stop in the objective 
reliance upon it violates the Fourth Amendment. 
Assuming the police make a Terry stop in objective 
reliance on a flyer or bulletin, we hold that the 
evidence uncovered in the course of the stop is 
admissible if the police who issued the flyer or bulletin 
possessed a reasonable suspicion justifying the stop. 
In Utah, both this Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have 
followed the Whiteley/Hensley "fellow officer" rule and have 
required that the issuing officer have a constitutional basis for 
police intrusion in order for the responding officer's seizure to 
be valid. In State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989) this Court 
made extensive reference to both Whiteley and Hensley in upholding 
an investigatory stop by responding officers, ultimately finding 
that the broadcast for aid was issued "by officers possessing 'a 
reasonable suspicion justifying a stop.1" In State v. Roth, 827 
P.2d 255 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992), the Utah Court of Appeals cited to 
Hensley and Bruce in holding that information originating from two 
(2) identified University of Utah Medical Center security officers 
that Roth was "getting vocal," his eyes were glazed, his speech 
slurred, he smelled strongly of alcohol, he had trouble standing, 
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and he continually started and stalled his red Pontiac Fiero 
automobile provided sufficient and reasonable suspicion that could 
be relied upon by a responding officer to stop Roth on suspicion of 
driving under the influence of alcohol. In State v. Seel, 827 P.2d 
954 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992), the Utah Court of Appeals cited to both 
Henslev and Bruce in holding a responding officer's seizure of Seel 
for suspicion of burglary valid. The court found that "the officer 
who dispatched the radio message was cognizable of articulable 
facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that defendant had 
committed the burglaries." 
In none of these cases did these courts consider the truth of 
the information upon which the seizing officer acted irrelevant. 
Nor did any of these courts uphold seizures based solely on the 
seizing officer's objective good faith reliance on the truth of the 
information transmitted to him. Rather, each of these courts 
focused on the substance of the originating dispatch and 
scrutinized the information transmitted for sufficient reasonable 
suspicion. 
(b) Informant tips in Terry stops: 
Several courts have reviewed the legality of an investigatory 
stop made by an officer who is relying upon information provided to 
him from a confidential informant. These cases universally hold 
that the seizing officer cannot "bootstrap" his authority by simply 
pointing to his reasonable reliance on the information provided to 
him. Rather, the cases hold that the underlying information must 
be reliable. 
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In 1968 the United States Supreme Court decided the landmark 
cases of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and its companions, 
Sibron v. New York, and Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968). 
These were the first cases in which the Supreme Court delineated 
the concept of a "stop and frisk" based on a police officer's 
personal observation of facts supporting a reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity. Later, in Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 
(1972), the Supreme Court determined that a Terry investigatory 
stop could be based on reliable information from an informant as 
opposed to the personal observations of the police. The Supreme 
Court noted: 
The informant was known to [the officer] personally and 
had provided [the officer] with information in the past. 
This is a stronger case than obtains in the case of an 
anonymous telephone tip. The informant here came forward 
personally to give information that was immediately 
verifiable at the scene. Indeed, under Connecticut law, 
the informant might have been subject to immediate arrest 
for making a false complaint had [the officer's] 
investigation proved the tip incorrect. Thus, while the 
Court's decisions indicate that this informant's 
unverified tip may have been insufficient for a narcotics 
arrest or search warrant . . . the information carried 
enough indicia of reliability to justify the officer's 
forcible stop of Williams. 
In Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990), the United States 
Supreme Court considered an investigatory stop based on an 
anonymous telephone tip. Citing to Adams v Williams, the Court 
held the stop was valid. The court began its reasoning by noting 
that "a tip such as this one, standing alone, would not 'warrant a 
man of reasonable caution in the belief that a stop was 
appropriate." The Court continued: 
[H]owever, in this case there is more than the tip 
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itself. 
Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent 
on both the content of the information possessed by 
police and its degree of reliability. Both factors -
quantity and quality - are considered in the "totality of 
the circumstances - the whole picture," ... that must be 
taken into account when evaluating whether there is 
reasonable suspicion. Thus, if a tip has a relatively 
low degree of reliability, more information will be 
required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion 
that would be required if the tip were more reliable. 
We think it is also important that, as in [Illinois v 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)], "the anonymous [tip] 
contained a range of details relating not just to easily 
obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the 
tip, but to future actions of third parties ordinarily 
not easily predicted." 
When significant aspects of the caller's predictions were 
verified, there was reason to believe not only that the 
caller was honest but also that he was well informed, at 
least well enough to justify the stop. 
Although it is a close case, we conclude that under the 
totality of the circumstances the anonymous tip, as 
corroborated, exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability 
to justify the investigatory stop .... 
One month later in 1990, the United States Supreme Court 
decided United States v. Thompson, 906 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1990). 
The Court upheld an investigatory stop of an automobile based on an 
informant's tip that its occupants were heading to rob a particular 
bank in another city. The court cited to both Adams v. Williams 
and Alabama v. White. In validating the stop, the court pointed to 
the following: (1) the informant identified herself and was known 
by the police to whom she gave her tip, (2) she had given police 
reliable information on Thompson in the recent past, (3) she 
described the car in which Thompson would be traveling, (4) she 
described his companion, (5) she described the planned crime and 
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heroin users were observed coming to the house and leaving after 
short intervals. Each day the same automobile was seen parked at 
the house. On the day preceding the arrest, this car arrived at 
the house at 8:30 a.m. and two (2) Mexican males exited the car and 
entered the house. They remained for about four (4) hours during 
which time several known and suspected heroin users entered and 
left the house through the back door. Upholding the arrests of the 
two (2) Mexicans, the court stated "[t]he independent, 
corroborating information received from the informants known to 
have been reliable in the past was duly verified by an extended 
surveillance." 
Similarly, in State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133 (Ut. Ct. App. 
1991), the Utah Court of Appeals cited to Adams v. Williams, 
Alabama v. White and Thompson and held that "[a] reasonable 
suspicion may be premised on an informant's tip so long as it is 
sufficiently reliable." The appellate court noted that the trial 
court made the following findings concerning the informant in 
Grovier: "The informant was known to Officer Davis; he had 
previously tipped Davis 10 to 15 times; he reported to Davis that 
he observed methamphetamine in an older green Buick Riviera driven 
by a male with a female passenger; he identified the license plate 
number as either 175 BAT or 175 -BAP; he last observed the vehicle 
on the south end of Main Street in Cedar City." The appellate 
court determined the informant's tip reliable based on "the 
totality of the circumstances." 
Again, as with the cases dealing with the fellow officer rule, 
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truthful, cogent information, resulting in bodily injury to C.I.111 
and who had personally observed contraband at the sight of the 
search. The officer/affiant in Anderton further verified that 
Anderton was suspected of selling contraband in quantity. 
The informant in State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203 (Utah 1984) 
was not identified in the affidavit because he feared retaliation. 
He informed the police he had observed stolen tools and car parts 
in the possession of a person who had admitted stealing them in a 
burglary. The same person also admitted to stealing a car. The 
police checked the informant's record and confirmed he had no 
felony arrests and that he was not a suspect in any crimes. The 
informant had given reliable information in the past, also 
regarding stolen vehicles. The police verified the* burglary, the 
stolen goods and auto parts, and that the vehicle had been reported 
stolen. The informant's description of the suspect's apartment was 
also corroborated by the police. The suspect's friend was found to 
have an extensive record for burglary and auto theft. 
In State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099 (1985), this Court again 
upheld a search warrant based totally on information from 
informants who had given reliable information in the past. One 
informant gave information of cultivation of marijuana to the 
officer/affiant. The same information was independently provided 
to a fellow officer from another informant. Both informants had 
provided reliable information in the past. The affiant officer 
corroborated certain aspects of the information from the two (2) 
informants by making personal observations of fencing.described by 
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warrant bar : * : f+-idrr i+ r - H * - ~ - orobabl~ -ar-*^ 1-^  ^  ->•*, 
almost excl,. . - • . . . ;;, * ;..n: *.;•.*..,, . : -
the fact that the aff iant/of t i cer had persoi.il contact otr 
knew the idr— * — aliiant 
and Informal ;;r.. ..'.:,» pa. i , . ^ I U U ,, ,'i,r:u.ilia ou\ s T O I H the 
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cite where the warrant was served. The affiant consulted with 
other narcotics detectives whose own informants also pointed to 
drug activity at the suspected cite. The affiant performed several 
corroborating acts to verify that the information gained from the 
three (3) informants was internally consistent. The court upheld 
the warrant primarily because of the repeated corroborating 
controlled buys from the cite and other corroborating factors. 
Similarly, in State v. Singleton, 214 Ut. Adv. Rep. 30 (Ut. 
Ct. App. 1993), the Court of Appeals reviewed a warrant issued on 
the strength of information derived cumulatively from four (4) 
informants. Again, the court noted that the information from the 
four (4) informants was internally consistent, the officer/affiant 
verified much of the information, and one (1) of the informants 
participated in controlled buys from the defendant. The warrant 
was upheld. 
Once again, in these cases, the courts were concerned with 
verification, corroboration, consistency of information derived 
from multiple sources, and historical reliability of the informant. 
Although not requiring all these elements of reliability to be 
present as to any single informant, none of these cases upheld a 
search based solely on the finding that the officer/affiant 
exhibited objective good faith in the information he had gathered. 
Again, these courts required sufficient indicia of reliability in 
the information itself as evidenced by consistency with other 
intelligence, past reliability of the informant, the officer's 
personal observation of corroborating or verifying factors, etc. 
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(d) "Citizen" tips in requests for search warrants: 
The Lv, ::/.'* • case had not hnon used b;;r the 
pel ice a s rormant J t eceived nothing I n 
consideration tci their informatic informants of thi s type are 
common I > " ' '"'Ci t:i zei it :ii i: if' Drmai i t s" 
sometimes a . . ^ i , ^ ;, ., u i t i i i i i y ^au sometimes remain anonymous. 
The c a s e s r o u t i n e l y r e c M • * n t i z e n informants are presumed 
r 
ci'viv." ..r .i lemuneratioii. 
[IjT^ .'eraj*_ neighbor witness is not the type of 
informant in need of independent proof of reliability or 
veracity. Rather, '[v]eracity is generally presumed when 
the information comes from an average citizen who is in 
a position to supply information by virtue of having been 
a crime victim or witness.1 State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 
175 (Utah 1983) (quoting LaFavre, Search and Seizure 
sectirr ^ ~' -i r \ —r r~\ \ 
I? t e r'^ t i n n . ^  * * • oucjh . p\ ^r t h r v - p - " a r e s *-'*•»f rjp=t i w ' 11" •" * * i *r*'-r 
i 
take n,-te c: i nc external indicia oi reliability or trie intormar, n 
received from them. 
1 •_ .x • ' b i d i e v . 
Treadwav, 499 P.2d 8-G (Utah I''1; < . iti/,en war- knou t lac 
police because of M r* former p'xr* it • CT i ;tice "f *~u* ^ ' * ^ 
H ^ : <_ i : 
other < dentil led persons -: observed control !"d substances . t *>e 
subject premises. 
. ;\: : :: a *. :~L : , ,. . .. .i a suspectea arug 
operatic State v. Miller, ya I * < (C ct App . c.<£ e 
police, in LUXII, persona 1- • T* • 1 * ' • • * <~ ' • ' 
two (2) swamp coolers blowing constantly into a bermed-up basement, 
a vented furnace-like apparatus in a boarded-up garage, and a 
series of grow lights. The neighbors had reported observing the 
occupants mixing peat moss, although the yard had never been cared 
for. A traffic survey conducted by the police identified cars of 
several known drug users coming and going from the residence in the 
early morning hours, staying only briefly. Neighbors had also 
observed a U-Haul truck on several occasions loading and unloading 
from a side door hidden from view at late hours. The neighbors 
reported that the garage doors were never open to public view. 
They also reported two (2) large dogs about when the occupants were 
mixing peat moss, but that the dogs always remained inside at other 
times. Utah Power & Light records indicated power lines servicing 
the residence that were three (3) times larger than necessary for 
a normal home, power consumption of four (4) to five (5) times in 
excess of normal, with one monthly bill of Two Thousand Four 
Hundred Dollars ($2,400.00). The power company had been denied 
access to the electric meter. One (1) of the occupants had a prior 
record for possession of marijuana and psilocybin mushrooms and 
appeared "suspicious" to the neighbors. Another had a record for 
possession of marijuana. The officer/affiant personally observed 
stacks of plastic buckets and- detailed in his affidavit how 
furnaces can be used to dry marijuana plants, how swamp coolers can 
humidify and vent a growing area, and how large electrical 
consumption, the truck, and grow lights can be associated with 
marijuana and mushroom production. A credit report showed one (1) 
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ol t-e occupants reported :; I.- self-employed at a body shop that 
d ^ - • i* .. \ 
but never had tools • :.*..>-
In State v. Stromberg, 783 p. A3 --4 * * A^r - -s--* ,i- ' ii 
C 
w a n a i /.u- affidavit reciteu tiia* -.* : citi^ei. ± iformant 
- a young qii ^served mariiuana pipe- r< -• r * : end ' father 
s - • 
the young informant ind i> JII iiun record ana that the suspect 
a prior convi cti on for possession j ,ir • iuan.< 
'1' Coi ii: t: :: f I i ppea] s i i i ,L-,: 
A p p 1 9 9 0 ) , u p n e i a \ warrant w h e r e . ; Ae t i t u a c i t i z e n d e s c r i b e d 
c o n f r o n t i n n r-Hir.^ r-r,>,^ t
 r, ,T- ^ n e i g h b o r h o o d h o u s e w i t h b a q q i e s 
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descripti on, i ndependentl y smel 1 ed marijuana .*~d raw what appeared 
to be ii nidi i iiii.iiiihi Iciil i>Lessed atjaim,! I he inside o| I lhi . islic 
greenhouse. 
53tate ^arsei , 6zt> P.^a olo ' ; : *' tie Utah 
Appeal: .;?:'. ' i a search warr.: ormant, 
although never before relied upon by :hc officer/affiant, "stated 
he hid obso*~<*nr* * ^ as "ware u>;n,-; — turners a 
1« • f .. . .~ ii.::i,:^ r a u e s c n u a residence. 
The i;* jnmar.* ilso assisted the police m nakn ] tv. :or,triu i ^ d 
• oys from the residence u^ 
between. The ,- i orman+- .'ccivci ,,1,;;;. . < ' .» 
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assistance. The officer corroborated the informant's information 
by personally observing persons entering and leaving the residence 
after very short intervals - consistent with the officers 
experience with narcotics trafficking. The officer further 
verified that the occupant of the residence was the person the 
informant identified through personal observation, police records, 
and driver's license records. The officer also confirmed that the 
occupant had a previous arrest for possession of controlled 
substance with intent to distribute. 
In State v. White, 210 Ut. Adv. Rep. 59 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993) 
two (2) family members, apparently concerned about their relative's 
drug use provided the police with information about the location of 
their relative's drug purchases. The Utah Court of Appeals noted 
that the informants were of the "concerned citizen" type whose 
credibility and reliability needed no verification. Nevertheless, 
the appellate court was still careful to point out how the 
information the two (2) citizens had supplied carried independent 
indicia of reliability: each informant independently observed 
incidents when the close family member purchased cocaine at the 
subject premises, each citizen independently indicated to the 
officer/affiant that the close family member for whom each was 
concerned had a long history of-drug abuse, the court noted that 
each informant corroborated and buttressed the other. Further, 
despite categorizing the informants as "citizens" not needing proof 
of reliability, the court additionally pointed to verification 
methods employed by the investigating officer/affiant: he verified 
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that the drug abuser di d Indeed have a criminal narcotics record, 
a -< ? 1. short stay visits at the suspected 
premises winui wa& ...indicative; drug traff i .:k imj . 
The Utah Court f Appeals. .• State v. Blaha, ? " "? 
Rei A idui •-. v-iti^- substantia M v 
sim.:,i: t •=- w..t ; White, above, T™ Blaha, the informant 
alsc a , 1 O S P M r ' \ member concerned about a relative's «Jrii i at uf*e. 
T v ion 01 ner 
relatives . u< urchases, aisc ; ,. remunerat nn. The 
officer/affiant similarly corroborated t!<> informant's information 
t + arrest 
consulting . . u second fami-> • • f i r m e d ^ ^ <;jug 
abuser i s f o r 4 c o c a i n e abuse a'id wh • cont inued * nat the 
c 
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 A ng * /pe 
short stay * -i^ -jfc:
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'The use of hearsay evidence to establish probable cause 
does not necessarily undercut the validity of a warrant. 
If the hearsay is reliable, and there is a substantial 
basis for qiving i: credence, ' " " support the 
issuance of -
 v--— • • • 
The court concluded: 
I n sjlort/ the hearsay evidence contained in the affidavit 
possessed adequate indicia of reliability. Moreover, 
corroborating evidence provides the hearsay with a 
substantial basis i 01 credibility, supporting the 
issuan *. of < warrant.,. 
This c • ,v** -•:-.".. - tnl:o r^--* - oi three (3) points to bp derived 
from, these ..._: . - :; •: ••- uia;i'; cases t:l lat ai e :i mporl.i » 
consideration of the issues in this case. First, there does not 
appear to be a bright-line test for definitively determining when 
a given informant is a "citizen informant" to be accorded the 
presumption of reliability. While the two (2) informants in the 
case at bar did not seek or receive remuneration and have not been 
routinely used by the police as informants, it does not necessarily 
follow that they are deserving of the presumption of reliability. 
Because WARDEN was unable to probe into their character, 
motivation, or their ability to perceive and relate facts, at the 
suppression hearing and because neither the trial court nor the 
Court of Appeals required the government to establish their 
veracity, reliability, or credibility, it can only be noted that in 
some respects they are similar to "citizen informants." It cannot 
be logically and conclusively determined that they were 
altruistically concerned for WARDEN'S well-being or that they were 
not upset with WARDEN for cutting them off in traffic or beating 
them to a parking space or that they were not just kids simply 
playing a joke on the police and/or WARDEN. In sum, it cannot be 
blindly assumed that every informant who does not give his name or 
who asks for no consideration is entitled to a presumption of 
reliability. 
Second, as each of thBse "citizen informant" cases 
demonstrate, courts have given lip service to the presumption of 
credibility for "citizen informants" but, at the same time the same 
courts take care to note the existence of external indicia of 
reliability and/or corroboration or other verification.factors that 
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bolster the citi zen's information. This is the better practice, 
Tl : i t c! 
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 Koi investigatory stops, 
that matters ,»n facts such as . * Lis fds^ where the informants are 
u 
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fa-
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unnecessary to as^^ss uit -formation's reliabil :*-v. •* should 
clearly state why, ecause i «* surely anomal u.«. * - 1: la t: the 
individual and hi- private property ,ir ful ^ protectee by the 
Fourth Amendment c * • -• et ^ -dividur- i s suspected of criminal 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Any police seizure of an individual in Utah (whether for 
penal, regulatory, or "welfare" purposes) based on information 
provided by third parties (whether fellow officers, snitches, or 
"citizen informants") ought not be condoned unless the third party 
information is determined by the court to be reliable and/or 
corroborated or verified. It is improper for a court to justify a 
police seizure only because the officer appeared to be objectively 
reasonable in his belief in the truth of the information provided 
by third parties. 
The "reasonable officer" language of the second tier of the 
Court of Appeals1 "community caretaker automobile stop" test is in 
conflict with previous holdings of this Court. Because the test 
does not require the police to act only on reliable information, it 
is vulnerable to abuse by pranksters, dishonest officers, and 
vindictive informants. In its present form, the test provides for 
no probing or inquiry by the trial court or defendant beyond the 
officer's good faith beliefs. 
While this Court may determine that there is a valid reason to 
justify a non-penal seizure of an individual in Utah, it should 
replace the "reasonable officer" language used in the second tier 
of the test with language which more properly focuses on the 
totality of the facts and circumstances available to the officer, 
including assessments of the reliability of the information and any 
corroborating factors. This Court should consider whether it is 
proper for individuals to be seized by the police simply because 
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some other unknown pc i son * an I * I 1 t onv incnig stor^ . 
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GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Defendant Brent Warden appeals his conviction of driving 
under the influence of alcohol, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Provo City Ordinance section 9/41-6-44. Warden 
challenges both the trial court's denial of his motion to 
suppress and its guilty verdict. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
At about 2:00 a.m. on the morning of May 9, 1991, Officer 
Jensen of the Provo City Police Department was on patrol. As he 
drove through a Denny's Restaurant parking lot, two men 
approached his car. They told the officer that a male had just 
asked them where he could buy some cocaine so he could "drive 
himself into a wall." The men described the car which the male 
was driving and supplied Officer Jensen with the license plate 
number. They also told him that the male was probably heading 
towards downtown Provo. The men then immediately returned to 
their car and drove away. Officer Jensen broadcast the vehicle 
description and plate number to all other units in an attempt to 
locate the male driver, and then left the parking lot to look for 
the driver himself. He drove towards downtown Provo and spotted 
the car on University Avenue. Officer Jensen made a U-turn to 
come in behind the vehicle and followed it for approximately a 
block and'a half. The male driver made a left turn and traveled 
at a normal rate of speed. Officer Jensen flashed his lights and 
the car stopped. 
After stopping the car, Officer Jensen approached Warden, 
the car's driver, and asked him for his driver's license and 
registration. After observing Warden, the officer noted that his 
breath smelled of alcohol and that he was unsteady on his feet. 
On that basis, Officer Jensen administered a standcird battery of 
field sobriety tests. When Warden failed to satisfactorily 
complete the tests, Officer Jensen arrested him for driving under 
the influence. Officer Jensen transported Warden to the police 
station where an intoxilyzer test recorded a .08 percent blood 
alcohol content. 
At trial, Officer Jensen testified that the only basis he 
had for the traffic stop was the information provided by the two 
unidentified men. According to the officer, he was concerned 
about the "person's mental stability and welfare on his own 
behalf." Upon the court's own questioning, the reason for the 
stop was further clarified: 
The Court: Any other reason at all for the 
stop? 
Officer Jensen: Basically, the stop—I was 
concerned for this person's welfare and 
mental stability. 
The Court: It was a welfare stop in your 
view? 
Officer Jensen: In my view, yes, it was a 
welfare stop for this person. It—at the 
time that I made the stop, I wasn't basing 
the stop on a DUI stop, that's what it later 
turned up to be; but I was basing the stop on 
a welfare check for this individual's 
wellbeing. 
Although the court noted that there was no reasonable 
suspicion that Warden was engaged in criminal activity when 
Officer Jensen stopped him, it denied Warden's motion to suppress 
the evidence seized as a result of the stop. The court ruled 
that when a police officer receives unverified information that a 
person is about to harm him or herself and makes a "welfare stop" 
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based upon that information, the officer is entitled to proceed 
with an arrest based upon evidence of crimes discovered during 
the welfare stop. The court found Warden guilty and this appeal 
followed. 
ISSUES 
The central question presented on appeal is one of first 
impression in Utah: Are law enforcement officers authorized to 
make "welfare" stops of citizens? If so, under what 
circumstances will such stops be lawful? Warden also claims on 
appeal that the trial court erred in considering inadmissible 
hearsay evidence. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"In absence of clear error, the trial court's findings of 
fact underlying its decision to grant or deny the suppression 
motion must be upheld." State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 
(Utah App. 1991) (citation omitted); State v. Hunter, 831 P.2d 
1033, 1033 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied. No. 920246, slip op. 
at (Utah November 3, 1992). "However, as for the trial 
court's legal conclusions in regards thereto, the correction of 
error standard applies." Steward, 806 P.2d at 215 (citation 
omitted). 
ANALYSIS 
Community Caretaker Stops 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
protects "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures." U.S. Const, amend. IV. The right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures extends to a person's 
automobile. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S. Ct. 
1391, 1396 (1979); see also State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 
1135 (Utah 1989) ("Although a person has a lesser expectation of 
privacy in a car than in his or her home, one does not lose the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment while in an automobile."). 
The Fourth Amendment is "implicated . . . because stopping an 
automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a xseizure' 
. . . even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the 
resulting detention quite brief." Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653, 99 S. 
Ct. at 1396. "Thus, the Fourth Amendment prohibits police 
officers from randomly or arbitrarily stopping vehicles on the 
highway." State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah App. 1992) 
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(citing Prouse. 440 U.S. at 654-56, 99 S. Ct. at 1396-98), cert, 
granted, No. 920319, slip op. at (Utah October 27, 1992). 
Specific situations in which police officers are justified 
in making stops of citizens in their vehicles include the 
following: 
(1) When the officer observes the driver 
commit a traffic violation; 
(2) when the officer has a reasonable 
articulable suspicion that the driver is 
committing a traffic offense, such as driving 
under the influence of alcohol or driving 
without a license; and 
(3) when the officer has a reasonable 
articulable suspicion that the driver is 
engaged in more serious criminal activity, 
such as transporting drugs. 
Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1043 (citations omitted); see also State v. 
Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (describing three 
levels of police-citizen encounters requiring different degrees 
of justification under the Fourth Amendment). An officer's 
reasonable articulable suspicion must be based upon objective 
facts apparent to the officer at the time of the stop. State v. 
Roth, 827 P.2d 255, 257 (Utah App. 1992). "Whether there are 
objective facts to justify such a stop depends on the *totality 
of the circumstances.'" State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 508 (Utah 
App. 1989) (quoting State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 
1987)). 
Utah appellate case law has not yet addressed, however, the 
legitimacy of police vehicle stops unrelated to a penal or 
regulatory purpose. Therefore, the trial court's recognition of 
the stop of Warden's vehicle as lawful because it was prompted by 
a concern for Warden's welfare, presents an issue of first 
impression in Utah. Because Utah law provides no guidance on the 
propriety of such stops, we look to other jurisdictions on this 
issue. 
One of the first cases to enunciate a standard for police 
stops to assist motorists, unrelated to penal or regulatory 
purposes, was United States v. Dunbar, 470 F. Supp. 704 (D. 
Conn.), aff'd. 610 F.2d 807 (2nd Cir. 1979). In this case, an 
officer stopped a motorist after observing that the license plate 
was from a neighboring state and deducing from the manner in 
which the driver was proceeding that he was lost. 
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Preliminarily, the court noted that "there is no basis for 
resolving this dispute without reference to the standards of the 
Fourth Amendment.11 Jd. at 706. The court determined that 
defendant was seized: " [S]topping an automobile and detaining 
its occupants constitute a * seizure' within the meaning of the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, even though the purpose of the 
stop is limited and the resulting detention is quite brief." Id. 
(quoting Prouse, 440 U.S. at 648, 99 S. Ct. at 1393). The Fourth 
Amendment's requirement of reasonableness is analyzed by weighing 
the individual's right to personal security against the public 
interest. Id. 
In assessing the weight to be assigned the public interest, 
Dunbar discussed the privacy intrusions which police commit in 
furtherance of "community caretaking functions." Id. at 707.1 
Dunbar applied the community caretaking concept to vehicle stops, 
reasoning that lf[i]t would be too extravagant to contend that a 
benign purpose of rendering assistance could never justify the 
stop of a motorist." Id. at 707. The court ultimately held, 
however, that under the facts before it, the balancing between 
the legitimate governmental interest in aiding a motorist and an 
individual's right to be free from arbitrary interferences from 
law enforcement officers weighed in favor of the individual. 
"The Fourth Amendment stands against initiating a new line of 
cases in which the officer says, AI thought he was lost.'" Id. 
at 708. 
Other jurisdictions have utilized the balancing test set 
forth in Dunbar with varying results. None, however, has 
explicitly rejected the notion that community caretaker concerns 
can justify stops and seizures under appropriate circumstances. 
For example, some courts discuss the need for a specific set of 
circumstances which are "beyond the ordinary, though not 
necessarily criminally suspicious" to justify an officer's stop 
of a vehicle. State v. Goetaski, 507 A.2d 751, 752-3 (N.J. 
Super. 1986), cert, denied, 517 A.2d 443 (N.J. 1986) (driving 
slowly on the shoulder of the road at 4:00 a.m. with left-turn 
signal blinking, was unusual enough circumstance to warrant the 
stop, but barely passed constitutional muster); see also McDougal 
v. State, 580 So. 2d 324, 325 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991) (stopping 
driver to inform him of how to retrieve confiscated firearms is 
not a justified circumstance); State v. Parker, 503 A.2d 809, 812 
(N.H. 1985) (justifying the stop of a driver of truck and camper 
1. Community caretaking functions were defined in Cady v. 
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 2528 (1973), as 
"totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or 
acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal 
statute." 
910634-CA 5 
when officer saw a child's head duck behind curtains in camper 
while parked in dark parking lot); State v. Chisolm, 696 P.2d 
41, 4 3 (Wash. App. 1985) (validating a police officer's momentary 
stop of a vehicle to warn the occupants that an item of their 
property was endangered); Russell v. Municipality of Anchorage, 
706 P.2d 687, 689 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (upholding a stop where 
a misted rear window could cause traffic hazards); Crauthers v. 
State, 727 P.2d 9, 11 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986) (authorizing officer 
checking on a driver stopped near side of road with his window 
rolled down when officer reasonably construed situation to be a 
request for assistance); but see, Qzhuwan v. State, 786 P.2d 918, 
922 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990) (invalidating check on two cars parked 
together in a campground because circumstances did not support a 
reasonable belief that the occupants of the vehicles needed 
assistance). 
Wisconsin articulated a detailed methodology for determining 
when a police stop of a vehicle is justified as a community 
caretaker activity in State v. Anderson, 417 N.W.2d 411 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 454 N.W.2d 763 (Wis. 1990). 
Police officers had stopped a car at 2:00 a.m. which was thought 
to have parked on prior occasions in private business stalls in 
the area. The state conceded there was no reasonable basis to 
suspect the driver of criminal activity. In Anderson, that court 
noted that a test for such police stops "requires an objective 
analysis of the circumstances confronting the police officer, 
including the nature and reliability of his [or her] information, 
with a view toward determining whether the police conduct was 
reasonable and justified." Id. at 413. If a community caretaker 
function is asserted as justifying a stop, 
[t]he trial court must determine: (1) that a 
seizure within the meaning of the fourth 
amendment has occurred; (2) if so, whether 
the police condxact was bona fide community 
caretaker activity; and (3) if so, whether 
the public need and interest outweigh the 
intrusion upon the privacy of the individual. 
Id. at 414. When the trial court addresses the third factor and 
weighs the public need and interest against the individual's 
privacy intrusion, Anderson notes that the following are relevant 
considerations: 
(1) the degree of the public interest and the 
exigency of the situation; (2) the attendant 
circumstances surrounding the seizure, 
including time, location, the degree of overt 
authority and force displayed; (3) whether an 
automobile is involved; and (4) the 
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availability, feasibility and effectiveness 
of alternatives to the type of intrusion 
actually accomplished. 
Id. 
After remand to the circuit court for application of the 
enunciated criteria, a second appeal ensued. State v. Anderson, 
439 N.W.2d 840, 846 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (Anderson II). In 
Anderson II. the court of appeals stated that the trial court's 
findings of factf referred to as historical facts, would be 
upheld unless they were against "the great weight and clear 
preponderance of the evidence." id. at 84 6. The court further 
noted that M[w]hether those facts satisfy the constitutional 
requirement of reasonableness presents a question of law, and 
therefore we are not bound by the trial court's decisions on that 
issue." Id. at 847. The court concluded that in this case, 
"[g]iven the relatively minor nature of the societal interest and 
the alternatives available short of seizure to pursue the matter 
. . . the seizure of Anderson's vehicle was unreasonable." Id. 
at 848. 
Having reviewed case law addressing automobile stops which 
are outside the penal and regulatory framework, we believe that 
adopting a test describing the criteria for community caretaker 
automobile stops is appropriate for the development of Utah's 
Fourth Amendment law. We therefore adopt a three tiered test— 
modeled in part on Wisconsin's Anderson test—to determine if a 
stop is reasonable, and, therefore, lawful under the Fourth 
Amendment. The trial court must evaluate the legitimacy of an 
alleged community caretaker stop as follows: First, did a 
seizure occur under the Fourth Amendment definition of that term? 
Second, based upon an objective analysis, was the seizure in 
pursuit of a bona fide community caretaker function—under the 
given circumstances, would a reasonable officer have stopped a 
vehicle for a purpose consistent with community caretaker 
functions? Third, based upon an objective analysis, did the 
circumstances demonstrate an imminent danger to life or limb? 
See Lopez. 831 P.2d at 1046 (describing reasonable officer 
standard). Our test differs from the Anderson test in that we 
require circumstances threatening life or safety, rather than 
using exigent situations as merely a factor in a mix of 
considerations. 
In adopting this test, we expressly disavow the reasoning in 
those cases which have upheld motorist stops when an 
insignificant article of the driver's personal property was 
endangered or when a motorist appeared to be lost in less than 
life-threatening circumstances. While these instances may 
represent legitimate community interests, they are entitled to 
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slight weight as compared to the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment. Instead, we adopt the requirement of imminent danger 
to life or limb as a component of the reasonableness test because 
of the Fourth Amendment's guarantee of "the right of the people 
to be secure" against arbitrary invasions by the government. See 
Scheckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218, 242, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 
2055-56 (1973). 
We also note that stops which are legitimate exercises of 
police community caretaker responsibilities, but which are not 
"reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment, may result in 
application of the exclusionary rule, while still achieving the 
objectives of community caretaking. This appears to be a 
legitimate means of encouraging genuine police caretaking 
functions while deterring bogus or pretextual police activities. 
Test as Applied to this Case 
The trial court upheld the validity of this stop as one for 
defendant's own welfare, stating that there was no independent 
reasonable suspicion to otherwise validate the seizure appealed 
by Warden under the Fourth Amendment.2 We conclude that the stop 
of Warden's vehicle was permissible under our community caretaker 
test and that the trial court did not err in denying the motion 
to suppress. 
Addressing the first prong of the test, Provo City concedes 
that Warden was seized under the Fourth Amendment definition of 
that term when the officer stopped his car. Second, based on an 
objective standard, we agree with the trial court that a 
reasonable police officer would have stopped Warden to help him 
because prevention of a suicide is consistent with an officer's 
community caretaker function. The officer was not acting within 
his duties of detection, investigation, or acquisition of 
evidence relating to the commission of crimes. Therefore, we 
determine that the officer was acting within a bona fide 
community caretaker function. Third, under our test the 
circumstances must have posed an imminent danger to life or limb, 
as determined by an objective standard. The unidentified men who 
informed the officer that Warden was threatening to harm himself 
created a reasonable basis upon which the officer could conclude 
that Warden was in imminent danger. Further, because it was late 
at night and the information given the officer suggested an 
immediate threat to Warden's physical safety or life, it was not 
reasonable to pursue an alternative means or to take time to try 
2. The facts are undisputed as to what happened prior to Officer 
Jensen's detention of Warden, as only the officer testified. 
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to verify the information other than by immediately locating 
Warden. 
Out of Court Statements 
Warden also argues that the trial court erred in admitting 
the unidentified men's statements regarding Warden's intention to 
harm himself. Officer Jensen testified that the men told him the 
driver of a white Pontiac had asked them where he could buy some 
coke so he could drive into a wall. Warden characterizes the 
admission of these statements as consideration of unreliable 
hearsay statements in violation of Utah Rules of Evidence 801 and 
802. Warden analogizes these statements to those of citizen 
informants in search warrant cases. He complains that there is 
no independent indicia of reliability for statements from 
unidentified citizens. The trial court, however, admitted these 
statements as evidence of verbal acts, and not for their 
substantive truth. The court limited the statements' use to 
evaluating the manner in which a reasonable officer would respond 
given this information. 
We review a trial court's decision to admit evidence as a 
question of law under a correctness standard. See State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 1991). We conclude the 
court correctly limited the admission of the unidentified males' 
statements to explain the conduct of the police officer. The 
statements were used to explain the officer's belief that the 
circumstances were exigent, requiring him to take action for 
Warden's safety. See State v. Collier, 736 P.2d 231, 234 (Utah 
1987) (officer's testimony as to conversation with confidential 
informant was not hearsay because admitted to explain police 
conduct); accord Lavton City v. Noon, 736 P.2d 1035, 1039 (Utah 
App. 1987) (officer's testimony regarding conversation with store 
clerk was not hearsay because admitted to explain police 
conduct). Because the evidence of the statements was offered for 
a purpose other than to prove the truth of the matters stated, it 
was not hearsay and was not excludable as such. Utah R. Evid. 
801(c); see Durfev v. Board of Educ., 604 P.2d 480, 485 (Utah 
1979) (evidence of utterances offered for purpose other than to 
prove truth of matter stated is not excludable hearsay). 
Therefore, the court did not err in admitting evidence of the out 
of court statements. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we reiterate the three tiered test for 
community caretaker automobile stops in Utah. First, the trial 
court must determine if a seizure occurred under the Fourth 
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Amendment. Second, the court must determine whether the seizure 
was in pursuit of a bona fide community caretaker function. 
Third, the court must ascertain whether the circumstances were 
such that there was a reasonable belief that the circumstances 
posed an imminent danger to life or limb. Under this community 
caretaker stop analysis, the officer's stop of Warden was lawful 
and there was no error in refusing to suppress the evidence of 
criminal activity seized as a result of that stop. Finally, the 
admission of testimony of the unidentified males' statements, 
explaining the officer's conduct under these circumstances, was 
not error. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's ruling 
denying Warden's motion to suppress evidence and affirm his 
conviction. 
WE CONCUR: 
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